In addition, the injury must be more than an "injury to the inter est in seeing that the law is obeyed."5 This requirement has its foundation in the bar against standing to litigate a '"generalized grievance' shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens."6 For a time, the bar on '"generalized griev ance [s] "' was viewed as merely a "prudential rule[]," not required by Article III and therefore subject to displacement by Congress.7
The Supreme Court's 1992 decision in Lujan, however, treated it as a gloss on the injury requirement and rooted in the case or contro versy language of Article III. 8 The Court insisted, as an Article III matter, that the injury must be to something more than "every citi zen's interest in the proper application of the Constitution and laws," and the litigant must not be "seeking relief that no more di rectly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large."9 Last year, the Court acknowledged that this bar on generalized grievances has been treated sometimes as a constitutional limit and sometimes as a prudential limit on standing.10 Significantly, it did not choose between characterizations, but instead subdivided the bar on generalized grievances into a prudential rule and a constitu tional rule. The prudential rule counsels hesitation before finding standing because "a political forum may be more readily available where an injury is widely shared."11 The constitutional rule re quires that the injury not be "of an abstract and indefinite naturefor example, harm to the 'common concern for obedience to 5. Akins, 118 S. Ct. at 1786. 6. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-500 (1975) (describing bar on standing "when the asserted harm is a 'generalized grievance' shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens" as a "prudential rule[ ]") (citations omitted); see also Allen, 468 U.S. at 751.
7. Wa rth, 422 U.S. at 499-500; Allen, 468 U.S. at 751. 8. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74 ("We have consistently held that a plaintiff ... claiming only harm to his and every citizen's interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large -does not state an Article III case or controversy."). Justice Kennedy's concurrence specifi cally noted:
The Court's holding . .. is a direct and necessary consequence of the case and contro versy limitations found in Article III .
[I]t would exceed those limitations if •.. in the absence of any showing of concrete injury, we were to entertain citizen suits to vindicate the public's nonconcrete interest in the proper administration of the laws. While it does not matter how many persons have been injured by the challenged action, the party bringing suit must show that the action injures him in a concrete and personal way. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580-81 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
9. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74. 10. See Akins, 118 S. Ct. at 1785 ("Whether styled as a constitutional or prudential limit on standing, the Court bas sometimes determined that where large numbers of Americans suffer alike, the political process, rather than the judicial process, may provide the more appropriate remedy for a widely shared grievance.").
11. Akins, 118 S. Ct. at 1786 (noting that the availability of a political forum to redress widely shared injuries "counsel[s] against, say, interpreting a statute as conferring standing").
law."'12 Later in the same passage, the Court purported to provide another "example" of such an "abstract" harm, but instead simply repeated that the harm cannot be "injury to the interest in seeing that the law is obeyed."13 Numerous scholars have demonstrated that insistence on a 'per sonal injury in fact as a requirement of Article III is a relatively recent invention.14 They point to a long history in English courts, in the courts of the several states, and in the federal courts themselves of judicial proceedings brought by those who have not suffered any such individualized injury in fact. For example, the prerogative writs of mandamus, prohibition, and certiorari, as well as qui tam, relator, and informer actions, could all be brought by litigants who had suffered no injury in fact.1s
12. Akins, 118 S. Ct. at 1785 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). See also Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. RE.v. 613, 617 (1999) (noting that the Court inAkins "made clear, for the first time, that Congress can grant standing to someone who suffers a quite generalized injury");
id. at 636 (describing the Court's "key step" as distinguishing between injuries that are "widely shared" and "injuries that are 'abstract and indefinite,' ... such as an injury 'to the interest in seeing that the law is obeyed"'); Th e Supreme Court 1997 Te rm, Leading Cases, Fe deral Ju risdiction & Procedure, 112 HARv. L. RE.v. 253, 260 (1998) [hereinafter Leading Cases] (suggesting that Akins can be read "as embracing a definition of injury distinctly broader and more accommodating than that in Lujan -a definition that distinguishes be tween widely shared 'concrete' injuries ... that are sufficient to confer standing and widely shared 'abstract' injuries that are not").
13. Akins, 118 S. Ct. at 1786.
14. See, e.g 221, 224-25 (1988) ; Louis L. Jaffe, Th e Citizen As Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. RE.v. 1033 RE.v. (1968 ; Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. RE.v. 1432 RE.v. (1988 RE.v. 163, 166 (1992) [hereinafter Sunstein, Wh at's Stand ing] (standing doctrine is "essentially an invention of federal judges, and recent ones at that"); Steven L. Wmter, Th e Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. RE.v. 1371 RE.v. (1988 .
15. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 14, at 819 (prohibition), 820 (certiorari), 823 (quo war ranto), 825-26 (informers or qui tam); Jaffe, supra note 14, at 1035 (prohibition, certiorari, mandamus); Sunstein, What's Standing, supra note 14, at 170-79; Wmter, supra note 14, at 1396 (mandamus, prohibition, certiorari) , 1404 (mandamus in federal court), 1406-09 (in former or qui tam). But see Bradley S. Clanton, Standing and the English Prerogative Writs:
Th e Original Un derstanding, 63 BROOK. L. RE.v.1001 RE.v. , 1008 RE.v. (1997 ( arguing that "a 'personal stake' or standing was indeed necessary to invoke the power of English courts in prerogative proceedings during the eighteenth century"). In reaching this conclusion, however, Clanton frequently observes that such actions "were brought by a relator in the name of the king" and were "understood to be the king's suit." Id. at 1033; see also id. at 1037 (contending that "fatal flaw" in Berger's argument is that quo warranto information, as a relator action, "was understood to be the suit of the king"); id. at 1041 (noting that "relator actions ... were understood to be the king's actions"). In such circumstances, Clanton simply deems the rela tor's standing to be "irrelevant." Id. at 1037-38; 1042. This declaration does nothing to un dermine the idea that the relators could initiate such actions without themselves having suffered an injury. [Vol. 97:2239 Most scholars reach the same conclusion from this history as Justice Harlan did in his dissent in Flast v. Cohen:1 6 there is nothing in the "judicial power," or "cases" and "controversies" language that requires the person bringing the action to suffer an injury in fact.17 For better or worse, however, the judges of the "inferior" federal courts do not feel so free to disregard Supreme Court prece dent.18 Their difficulty in following this precedent has been acute in cases where the ancient forms persist, particularly qui tam actions.
In a qui tam action, an individual who has herself suffered no harm brings an action on her own behalf as well as on behalf of the government. Indeed, the term qui tam is short for "qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso sequitur" -"who as well for the lord the king as for himself sues."19 The individual bringing the action is typically called an "informer" or a "relator."20 As the Supreme Court explained in 1905:
Statutes providing for actions by a common informer, who himself had no interest whatever in the controversy other than that given by statute, have been in existence for hundreds of years in England, and in this country ever since the foundation of our Government. The right to recover the penalty or forfeiture granted by the statute is fre-16. 392 U.S. 83, 120 (1968) {Harlan, J., dissenting) (pointing, in part, to the history of qui tam actions, and noting that " [t] his and other federal courts have repeatedly held that indi vidual litigants, acting as private attorneys-general, may have standing as 'representatives of the public interest"' and that it is "clear that non-Hohfeldian plaintiffs ... are not constitu tionally excluded from the federal courts" (quoting Scripps-Howard Radio v. Commn., 316 U.S. 4, 14 {1942))). See also F/ast, 392 U.S. at 130 (concluding that public actions are "within the jurisdiction conferred upon the federal courts by Article III .. . ").
17. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 14, at 840 {"In sum, the notion that the constitution de mands injury to a personal interest as a prerequisite to attacks on allegedly unconstitutional action is historically unfounded .... There may well be policy arguments in favor of a 'per sonal interest' limitation on standing, but they cannot rest on historically-derived constitu tional compulsions. "); Jaffe, supra note 14, at 1043 {"The burden of my argument ..• has been that there are no compelling constitutional reasons for denying jurisdiction of citizen and taxpayer actions. It is almost impossible any longer to contend that a Hohfeldian plain tiff is a necessary element of a case or controversy. "); Sunstein, Public Law, supra note 14, at 1478-79 (presenting view that Article III requires an injury in fact is "misguided"); Winter, supra note 14, at 1374 ("A fuller account of our history shows that article III was not limited to the kinds of private disputes characterized by standing. "). See also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., In dividual Rights and the Po wers of Government, 27 GA. L. REv. 343, 385 (1993) (noting that "a standing doctrine that is rooted in the requirement of injury in fact lacks intellectual coherence").
18. See generally Evan Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Sup erior Co urt Prece dents?, 46 STAN. L. REv. 817 (1994) .
19. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY {2d ed. 1989); see also 3 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTA· RIES 160 {facsimile of first edition 1768) (U. Chi. Press 1979) (giving full Latin as "qui tam pro domino rege, &c., pro seipso in hac parte sequitur," thus indicating that the action was brought only "in part" ("in hac parte") for himself but also for the king and the rest ("&c.") -presumably the rest of the co=unity); cf. Evan Caminker, Comment, Th e Constitutional ity of Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 341, 341 n. 1 {1989) (providing a slightly different version).
20. See Caminker, supra note 19, at 341-42 n. 1.
quently given to the first common informer who brings the action, although he has no interest in the matter except as informer .21
Although qui tam statutes have been part of federal law from the first Congress,22 the major such statute in current use is the False Claims Act.2 3 The False Claims Act permits any person to sue a . defendant accused of defrauding the government and, if successful, to keep a percentage of the amount recovered. 24
Current standing doctrine and deeply rooted qui tam practice are on a collision course. It is not surprising that qui tam defend ants have argued that current standing doctrine renders the qui tam provision of the False Claims Act unconstitutional. Nor is it sur prising that federal courts have almost universally rebuffed the challenges to such a long-standing practice. Indeed, courts fre quently use the argument of historical pedigree to uphold the con stitutionality of qui tam actions.2 5 As one court put it, "The concept of qui tam is so deeply rooted in the nation's history that it is most improbable that any court today could divine some infirmity of constitutional magnitude which would not have been equally ap parent many decades, if not centuries, ago."2 6
One bold district court held the qui tam provision of the False Claims Act unconstitutional, brushing aside its historical roots by candidly noting that the Supreme Court's current standing doctrine is a recent invention.27 But other courts, seeking to reconcile the 21. See Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 225 (1905) (rejecting a constitutional attack on a state statute because to accept it "would be in effect to hold invalid all legislation providing for proceedings in the nature of qui tam actions"); see also United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 541 n.4 (1943) (rejecting an argument that qui tam statutes are judicially disfavored and should be strictly construed, and noting that "[q]ui tam suits have been fre quently permitted by legislative action, and have not been without defense by the courts" (footnotes omitted)).
22. 721-22 (1993) )); see also Blanch, supra, at 723 ("To point at history and argue that standing doc trine cannot screen out qui tam actions is to ignore the fact that at one time Article III had an entirely different screening mechanism than it has now."); Thomas R. Lee, Co=ent, The Standing of Qui Ta m Realtors Un der the Fa lse Claims Act, 51 U. Cm. L. REv. 543, 549 (1990) history of qui tam actions with current standing doctrine, bend over backwards (indeed, so far as to create a circle) in their eagerness to find an injury in f act. Some conclude that the bounty provided to a qui tam relator somehow constitutes an injury in fact.28 Although the Supreme Court itself may have encouraged such an approach by distinguishing qui tam actions from "citizen suits" along these lines,29 it has aptly been described by one district judge as "put [ ting] the cart before the horse."30 Ironically, that same judge traced a different circle to find an injury in fact, reasoning that a qui tam relator is injured because she runs the risk of retaliation for filing the qui tam action itself.31
The most interesting approach taken by some courts (or at least the one of most significance for this article) is not to look for an injury in fact to the qui tam relator, but instead to look for an injury in fact to the United States and treat the relator as either a repre sentative or an assignee of the United States.32 In the cases covered ("Standing is a modem game, and courts that uphold qui tam on historical grounds are play ing by archaic rules. ").
28. Notice the assumption of this approach: the United States, no less than any other litigant, must have suffered an injury in fact in order for litigation brought on its behalf to constitute a case or con troversy within the federal judicial power.3 4 Of course, this seems a reasonable assumption for a lower federal court to make. After all, the Supreme Court has repeatedly insisted that the words "case" or "controversy" in Article III require an injury in fact.3 5 And nothing in Article III remotely suggests that the United States can litigate something other than a "case" or "controversy" in an Article III court.
Despite its apparent reasonableness under current Supreme Court doctrine, I submit that no federal judge, if pressed, would seriously contend that Article III requires that the United States must suffer an injury in fact that is "personal," "concrete and partic ularized," and "actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical" before litigation on its behalf can be brought in federal court. And no federal judge would contend that injury to the United States be more than an "abstract ... injury to the interest in seeing that the law is obeyed .... "3 6 My point of pressure is a federal criminal prosecution. That is, while Akhil Amar has argued that "too few of those who write in criminal procedure do serious, sustained scholar ship in constitutional law generally, or in fields like federal jurisdic- , 961 F.2d 46, 49 (4th Cir. 1992 ) ("The government, and not the relator, must have suffered the 'injury in fact' required for Article III standing."); Amin, 26 F. Supp. at 168 n.l ("In a qui tam action, the United States suffers the injury and remains the true plaintiff, the party whose standing is at issue .... "). But see Lee, supra note 27, at 570 (claiming that standing doctrine makes an "exception" to the injury requirement "where the government itself acts as plaintiff" ). [Vol. 97:2239 tion and remedies,"37 I suggest that constitutional law, federal jurisdiction, and remedies might learn something from criminal pro cedure. By focusing in Part II on criminal prosecutions, a common place legal proceeding familiar to today's lawyers and judges, my hope is that those who have been unmoved by the history of pre rogative writs and qui tam actions will see that Article III cannot require an injury in fact.38 Similarly, I use criminal procedure to show in Part III that the separation of powers issues now treated under the rubric of Article III standing are better understood as issues of Article I and Article II.
II. C RIMINAL C AS ES AND THE N ONSENSE OF REQUIRING INJURY IN FACT UNDER ARTICLE III
Suppose a new assistant federal defender, steeped in the Supreme Court's modern standing doctrine, moves to dismiss each of the prosecutions brought against her clients on the grounds that the United States lacks standing. She argues that the United States lacks a personal, concrete, and particularized injury in fact and therefore there is no case or controversy within the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
I suppose that the first reaction would be the one I received as a new assistant federal defender when, at my first court appearance, I argued that my client -a previously deported alien charged with illegal reentry into the United States with whom I had little or no time to speak beforehand -was not a flight risk because the ac tions of which he was accused demonstrated that he really wanted to be in this country.39 But after the laughter subsided, what would the prosecutor and the judge say? What is the "concrete and partic ularized" injury in fact suffered by the United States that gives it standing to bring a criminal prosecution? Some crimes, of course, cause an actual, concrete, particularized injury to the United States. For example, when someone steals property belonging to the United States,40 the United States suffers such an injury -just as some courts in qui tam cases observe that the United States suffers such an injury when it is defrauded of money. But in the vast majority of criminal prosecutions, the L. REv. 309, 446 {1995) (treating standing of criminal defendants as "core" example of cases in which litigants are "interested in seeking relief on their own with no larger agenda").
39. The Bail Reform Act of 1984 provides for the temporary detention of anyone "not a citizen of the United States or lawfully admitted for permanent residence" who "may flee," 18 U.S.C. § 3142{d) (1994), so there was little hope of success with more conventional argu· ments at this first judicial appearance.
40. See 18 U. S.C. § 641 ("Whoever ... steals ... any record, voucher, money, or thing of value of the United States" shall be fined and imprisoned.).
United States is not seeking redress for this kind of an injury to itself.
Perhaps one might be tempted to say that the injury in fact re quired by Article III is the one suffered by the victim of the crime: for example, the person who was kidnapped and taken across state lines41 or the person who was defrauded by a pyramid scheme using the U.S. Mails.42 On this theory, the United States has a form of third-party standing allowing it to redress the injuries suffered by others. But this approach is deeply flawed. If the United States had third-party standing, one would expect the "first-party" -the victim -to have standing. But our long-standing practice (albeit one not required by Article III) is that the victim of the crime may not bring a federal criminal prosecution.43 And criminal punish ments such as probation, incarceration, and fines payable to the United States do little to redress injuries suffered by the victim.44 Moreover, in the most common federal prosecution -possession and sale of illegal drugs45 -there is no identifiable victim at all.
Alternatively, although this may not come with good grace from a prosecutor, one might try to shift the focus to the defendant and contend that the relevant injury is the one that the government is seeking to impose on the defendant. 42. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 ("Whoever, having devised ... a scheme or artifice to defraud ... for the purpose of executing such scheme ... places in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever" shall be fined and imprisoned. ).
43. See Harold J. Krent, Executive Control Over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some Les sons From History, 38 AM. U. L. REv. 275, 293 (noting that Judiciary Act of 1789 "implicitly vested the district attorneys with exclusive authority to prosecute all federal crimes within their jurisdiction"); id. at 292, 296 (noting that "C ongress never vested victims with a general right to prosecute defendants under federal criminal provisions" and that although "citizens in the first years under the Constitution evidently presented evidence of crimes directly to the grand jury," even if the grand jury indicted, the district attorney retained control and could drop the prosecution). Krent also argues that qui tam actions were considered "quasi At this point, even a patient judge (or reader) might be ready to throw up her hands and say, "The United States isn't any ordinary litigant. A federal criminal prosecution is not designed to remedy the injury to any particular victim, but rather to remedy an injury done to the community. It is wrong to try to shoehorn the United States in the mold of a common law private litigant. It is the sover eign, seeking to vindicate the general public interest in compliance with the law."47 I agree, but it still does not solve the problem under current standing doctrine.48 For the very point of the current doctrine is to exclude from federal court those who seek to vindicate the general public interest in compliance with the law, to treat an injury to "every citizen's interest in the proper application of the Constitu tion and the laws" as insufficient to invoke federal judicial power, and to insist that Article III prevents Congress from authorizing litigation where the "harm at issue is ... of an abstract and indefi nite nature -for example, harm to the common concern for obedi ence to law."49 In short, if current standing doctrine is correct, then the vast majority of federal criminal prosecutions are not "cases" or "controversies" and the United States lacks standing to initiate them.
convicted criminal will incur the most severe consequences that the state or federal govern ment can impose ").
47. See Lee, supra note 27, at 569 ("The government certainly has standing in criminal cases .. .. "); Siegel, supra note 32, at 554 ("The United States is generally a proper party to bring suit to enforce federal law .. 387, 392 (1995) (noting that when a state "prosecutes criminal and civil actions under its own laws in its own courts, no issue ordinarily arises as to its standing ").
A closely related argument would posit certain "personal " interests unique to the sover eign. While perhaps this might have some force in a monarchy in which sovereignty is per sonifi ed in the king, cf. Clanton, supra note 15, at 1038 ("[T)he king was clearly the most interested party in executing the criminal laws."), it is not persuasive in a nation established on the principle that governments "deriv[e] their just power from the consent of the gov erned, " DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) , and whose constitution is made in the name of "We the People." U.S. CoNST. preamble.
48. Cf. Lee, supra note 27, at 570 (contending that the government has "special constitu tional status as plaintiff ... and it need not show a particularized injury as a predicate to sue."); Larry W. Yackle, Wo rthy Champions of Fo urteenth Amendment Rights: Th e Un ited States As Parens Pa triae, 92 Nw. L. REv. 111, 135-37 (1997) (suggesting that since modem standing doctrine was created to protect the executive, it "makes little sense, then, to tum standing doctrine against the Executive ... ").
49. Federal Election Commn. v. Akins, 118 S. Ct. 1777, 1785 (1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Of course, this is an absurd result. Article III cannot sensibly be read to prohibit the United States from vindicating its sovereign interests in its own courts. Removed from its context and recast as a general principle, then, Chief Justice Marshall's assertion that " [t] he province of the judiciary is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals" is simply wrong.50 So, too, is Justice Scalia's assertion that " [v] indicating the public interest ... is the function of Congress and the Chief Executive,"51 with courts restricted to "protecting in dividuals and minorities against impositions of the majority .. .. "52
Courts do not exist solely to resolve private disputes or to re solve claims by injured individuals against the government or gov ernment officials. Instead, as criminal prosecutions attest, a significant role of courts is simply to enforce the sovereign's law in particular cases.s3
One caveat is in order. Article III extends the judicial power of the United States to certain "cases" 54 as well as certain "controver sies."55 A number of scholars suggest that the term "cases" in Article III includes criminal prosecutions, while the term "contro versies" does not.56 If they are right, then the foregoing critique, relying as it does on the example of criminal prosecutions, shows only that the word "case" in Article III cannot reasonably be un derstood to require a personal, concrete, and particularized injury Vol. 97:2239 in fact. It tells us nothing about whether the word "controversy" in Article III can be understood to require this kind of injury.
Professor Robert Pushaw draws a different distinction between "cases" and "controversies." He contends that the key difference is that the primary judicial role in "controversies" is the resolution of particular disputes while the primary judicial role in "cases" is the exposition of legal norms. 57 Although there is some ambiguity in Pushaw's use of the term, he views "exposition" -the claimed ju dicial role in "cases" -as simply the interpretation and application of the law to particular facts, regardless of the existence of any pre existing private dispute, in order to secure the enforcement of that law.SS 57. See Robert J. Pushaw, Article Ill's Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Func tion of Federal Courts, 69 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 447, 494 (1994) ("[T] he federal judiciary's primary role was to be exposition in 'Cases,' with a lesser function of resolving disputes in 'Controversies."'). This distinction may be helpful in understanding why some heads of fed eral ·jurisdiction are defined by legal subject and some are defined by party status. In Pushaw's view, current standing doctrine takes concepts that make some sense as applied to "controversies" and erroneously applies them in "cases" as well. Id. at 519 ("The Court's basic problem lies in applying fiusticiability doctrines such as standing] -and their underly ing dispute resolution model of adjudication -exclusively to 'Cases' ... which primarily involve federal law declaration. Conversely, justiciability doctrines are not used where they would make the most sense: to limit the 'Controversies' (i.e., disputes) federal courts must resolve."). (1996) (parenthetically defining "judicial power" as "the interpretation and application of pre-existing legal rules to particular facts"). Pushaw treats "exposition" and "expound" as cognates; definition 3 of the word "expound" in THE OXFORD ENGLISH D1cnoNARY (2d ed. 1989), is "to give a particular interpretation to," a usage it describes as "now chiefly in law."
Pushaw might be read, however, to suggest that the judicial role in cases is not so much the enforcement of law through the issuance of judgments, but the explanation and elabora tion of legal norms, ideally in published opinions. See, e.g., Pushaw, supra note 57, at 449 (claiming that a judge's "primary role" in a "case" is to "answer the legal question presented" and that a court's "main function" in "cases" is "to declare the law in matters of national and international importance"); id. REv. 123, 126 (1999) ("The operative legal act performed by a court is the entry of a judgment; an opinion is simply an explanation of reasons for that judgment."), and in a letter commenting on a prior draft of this article, Pushaw has stated that the interpreta tion of "exposition" contained in the text is the one he intended. Letter from Robert Pushaw to author, March 25, 1999, at 4; see also Pushaw, Congressional Po wer, supra, at 860 (parenthetically defining "judicial power" as "the authority to render a final judgment after applying the law to particular facts"). Moreover, treating the judicial role in cases as enforce ment of law rather than explanation of law permits the analysis to extend readily to federal trial courts. As criminal prosecutions illustrate, federal trial courts have a major role in ap plying the law to particular facts in order to secure the enforcement of the law. Cf. Pushaw, supra note 57, at 527 n.377 (conceding that "federal district courts probably have at least as important a role in settling disputes as they do in interpreting federal law" and concluding that "my analysis principally applies to federal appellate courts").
In criminal cases (and perhaps more generally in Article III "cases"), the judiciary is enforcing the sovereign's law rather than umpiring a preexisting dispute. s 9 Thus, criminal prosecutions demonstrate that, at least when exercising jurisdiction over the "cases" enumerated in Article III, nothing in Article III limits the use of the federal judicial power to enforcement of the rights of individuals or prohibits the use of the federal judicial power to en force the majoritarian sovereign will .
In short, if -as all concede -the United States can prosecute crimes in the federal courts, then a "case" within the meaning of Article III must include litigation that is based on nothing more than the "harm to the common concern for obedience to law," 60 and the "abstract ... injury to the interest in seeing that the law is obeyed. " 6 1 III. WHAT STANDING Is REALLY ABoUT: THE ARTICLE I AND II lssUES
If current standing doctrine is so thoroughly wrong, why have so many Supreme Court Justices insisted that it is a fundamental as pect of constitutional separation of powers? I subinit that there are separation of powers concerns afoot, but they are more properly considered as arguments primarily about the meaning of Articles I and II, not Article III.
A. The Article I Issue
A number of scholars have persuasively argued that the Supreme Court's efforts to treat standing as a transsubstantive juris dictional issue are Inisguided. 6 2 They explain that the question of standing is best treated as a question indistinguishable from 59. See Pfander, supra note 56, at 616 (noting that a clause that "refers to 'cases' ... thus deals primarily with the enforcement of federal law"); cf. Harrison, supra note 56, at 231-32 (noting that "cases" include criminal prosecutions under federal statutes, state prosecutions met by federal defenses, and criminal prosecutions of foreign diplomatic or consular officers, while most "controversies" would be between individuals, so the term underlines the private nature of such disputes).
60. Federal Election Commn. v. Akins, 118 S. Ct 1777, 1785 (1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
61. Akins, 118 S. Ct at 1786. I do not mean to attack all Article III justiciability doc trines; my criticism is limited to current standing doctrine. In particular, I have no quarrel with the ban on advisory opinion or the finality doctrine. See Hartnett, supra note 58, at 145-46 (supporting these doctrines and noting that the "central feature that constitutes a 'case' or 'controversy' is that it results in a judgment").
62. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 14, at 233 (injury-in-fact requirement "impedes rather than assists analysis" because question regarding injury "must be seen as part of the question of the nature and scope of the substantive legal right on which the plaintiff relies"); id. at 291 (standing "is a question of substantive law").
whether the party has a right of action.6 3 Phrased this way, the is sue is one of substantive and remedial law, not one of Article III jurisdiction. 64 Such scholarly efforts to dismantle Article III standing doctrine and redirect attention to the issues of substantive and remedial law, however compelling on their own terms, do not make the separa tion of powers concerns that judges have forced into that doctrine disappear. Instead, the question becomes whether the judiciary may create rights of action and remedies on its own or whether it must instead wait for legislative action. 65 Some argue that the crea tion of rights of action and their accompanying remedies are (unless constitutionally required66) legislative questions left to Congress there is private right of action); Fletcher, supra note 14, at 239 ("The essence of a standing inquiry is the meaning of the specifi c statute or constitutional provision upon which the plain tiff relies .... "); Sunstein, Public Law, supra note 14, at 1475 ("[T]he existence of standing and the existence of a cause of action present the same basic question."); Sunstein, Wh at's Standing, supra note 14, at 166 ("The relevant question is instead whether the law -gov erning statutes, the Constitution, or federal co=on law -has conferred on the plaintiffs a cause of action."); Wm ter, supra note 14, at 1451 ("For over a hundred years, the metaphor of 'standing' was shorthand for the question of whether a plaintiff had asserted claims that a court of equity would enforce."); id. at 1470 ("'Standing' is and can only be a question about the legal rights at stake."). Cf. Maxwell L. Steams, Standing Back fr om the Fo rest: Jus ticiability and Social Choice, 83 CAL. L. REv. 1309, 1382-83 (1995) (agreeing that standing is "inevitably substantive, rather than procedural," while contending that standing doctrine, by presumptively finding "no right to enforce the rights of others," "no right to prevent diffuse harms," and "no right to an undistorted market" works to prevent litigants from manipulat ing the path of the legal decisions).
Professor Sunstein attempts to maintain a link with Article III, contending that if
there is no cause of action, there is no "case" or "controversy." Sunstein, Wh at's Standing, supra note 14, at 222. If a plaintiff fails to state a cause of action (or, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a claim upon which relief can be granted), the dismissal is on the merits, not for lack of jurisdiction. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946) (noting that it is "well settled that the failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction"). See also Sunstein, Wh at's Standing, supra note 14, at 210 (arguing that it is "implausible to say that constitutional provisions create [private rights of action] when the relevant duty runs to the public as a whole rather than to affected individuals").
under Article I,67 while others argue that, at least in the first in stance, courts properly create (or broadly infer) such rights of ac tion and remedies.6s
So understood, the injury-in-fact requirement would be de moted from a constitutional rule to a principle of statutory con struction:69 in the absence of a clear statement from Congress to the contrary, the judiciary will infer rights of action only for the 67. See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 730-31 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("As the Legislative Branch, Congress ... should determine when private parties are to be given causes of action under legislation it adopts .... When Congress chooses not to provide a private civil remedy, federal courts should not assume the legislative role of creat ing such a remedy."); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 427-30 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting) (stating that, while Congress could create right of action for damages against federal officials for violating the fourth amendment, the Court may not do so); Bivens, 403 U.S. at 412 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the creation of right of action for damages is exercise of legislative power and " [l] egislation is the business of Congress"); cf. Karahalios v. National Fedn. of Fed. Employees, 489 U.S. 527, 536 (1989) (refusing to recognize a private right of action and noting that "Congress undoubtedly was aware ... that the Court had departed from its prior standard for resolving a claim urging that an implied statutory cause of action should be recognized, and that such issues were being resolved by a straightforward inqniry into whether Congress intended to provide a private cause of action"); Morse v. Republican Party of Va ., 517 U.S. 186, 230 (1996) (Stevens, J., announcing the judgment of the Court) (implying a right of action under § 10 of the Vo ting Rights Act because Supreme Court precedent at the time the statute was enacted was much more receptive to such inferences than current precedent).
See also Sunstein, Public Law, supra note 14, at 1475 (" [L]itigants do not have standing unless Congress or the Constitution has granted them a right to bring suit."); Wm ter, supra note 14, at 1513 ("If standing is really about the right to be recognized and its concomitant remedies, then Congress, and not the Court, should have the ultimate power to define standing.").
68. See, e.g., Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (establishing four part test for implying right of action); Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396-97 (implying private right of action for damages for violation of fourth amendment in absence of "explicit congressional declaration" to the con trary or "special factors counselling hesitation"); J.I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) (implying private right of action for damages as a "necessary supplement" to Securities & Exchange Commission enforcement); see also Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 541 n.4 (1943) ("Statutes providing for a reward to informers which do not specifically either authorize or forbid the informer to institute the action are construed to authorize him to sue.") (citation omitted).
69. See Fletcher, supra note 14, at 239 (suggesting that standing precedents "are useful as presumptions aids for construction"); see also id. at 252 (arguing that dismissals for lack of prudential standing are better described and understood as refusals to "infer a cause of ac tion absent a clear statutory directive"); cf. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Lujan v. Defenders of Wi ldlife: Standing as a Ju dicially Imp osed Limit on Legislative Po wer, 42 DUKE L.J. 1170 42 DUKE L.J. , 1198 42 DUKE L.J. -99 (1993 (arguing that all of the Court's opinions prior to Lujan were "consistent with the principle of legislative supremacy"). Such a demotion of the injury-in-fact requirement would be especially appropriate since the injury-in-fact requirement was born in an interpre tation of the Administrative Procedure Act. See Sunstein 555, 580 (1992) (noting that the Court must be "sensitive to the articulation of new rights of action that do not have clear analogs in our common-law tradition" but that "Con gress must at the very least identify the injury it seeks to vindicate and relate the injury to the class of persons entitled to bring suit") (Kennedy, J., concurring). See In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895) (upholding injunction against Pullman strike of 1894 without need for Congressionally created right of action). In Debs, the Supreme Court ex plicitly declined to rely on any Act of Congress, 158 U.S. at 600, or to place its decision solely on the property interest of the United States in the mail carried on the railways, preferring to rest its decision on broader grounds. 158 U.S. at 583-84. It reasoned that the "obligations which [the executive branch of the United States] is under to promote the interest of all, and to prevent the wrongdoing of one resulting in injury to the general welfare, is of itself suffi cient to give it a standing in court." Debs, Federal criminal prosecutions may have something to tell us about this debate. For one of the earliest, most significant, and most enduring decisions the federal judiciary has ever made was to leave the creation of criminal rights of action to Congress and to refuse to recognize a common law of federal crimes.75 To my mind, the example of criminal prosecutions suggests the wisdom of insist ing that it is the job of Congress, not the courts, to create rights of action to vindicate the public's interest in obedience to the law.76
Yet even those who would distinguish criminal prosecutions from other public rights of action77 and encourage greater judicial creativity should, I believe, agree that this is the right set of ques tions to be asking -that what is truly at stake in current standing doctrine is not the meaning of "cases" and "controversies" in Arti cle III, but the extent (and possible exclusivity) of the legislative power of Article ps Monaghan, Th e Protective Po wer of the Presidency, 93 CoLUM. L. REv. 1, 65-66 (1993) (sug gesting that Debs can be "at least understood," if not defended, as an example of the protec tive power of the executive, without statutory authority, "to make contracts and, more importantly, to sue to protect the personnel and property interests of the United States, and when necessary to use force and other resources to protect them").
74. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 14, at 277 (describing Ju stice Harlan's opinion in Flast as "widely admired").
75. See United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812) ("The legislative authority of the Union must first make an act a crime, affix a punishment to it, and declare that Court that shall have jurisdiction of the offence."); Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. at 32 ("Although this question is brought up now for the first time to be decided by this Court, we consider it as having been long since settled in public opinion."). Significantly, the Court in Hudson & Goodwin was willin g to assume, at least arguendo, an implied power in the United States to "preserve its own existence, and promote the end and object of its creation," but insisted that it did not follow that the courts could act without an act of legisla 76. Cf. Steams, supra note 38, at 456 ("The injury in fact requirement ... is intended to protect Congress's power to govern. Critical to that power ... is the power not to make law unless and until an appropriate consensus forms.").
77. See, e.g., Ya ckle, supra note 48, at 130 (suggesting that the executive should have a right of action to enforce constitutional rights, even if "there are occasions," such as criminal
prosecutions, "when we might demand explicit congressional authority for suits to enforce federal statutes").
78. Of course, one might rephrase the question to concern the appropriate scope of "judi cial power" under Article III, and thus make it an Article III question. Let us take stock of where we are. We have seen that there is no impediment in Article III to a federal court enforcing the law of the sovereign in the interests of the public, such as in a criminal case.79 We have also seen that the strongest conclusion that we can draw from Article I is that the judiciary should leave the creation of rights of action to· vindicate the public interest to Congress, as in the statutes creating federal crimes.so The constitutional question that remains to be addressed is "Who can constitutionally be empow ered to represent such public interests in court?" That is a question of the proper interpretation, not of Article III or Article I, but of Article II.8 1
It is no coincidence that the Ju stice most dedicated to using the doctrine of standing to bar actions seeking to vindicate the public interest in law enforcement is the same Ju stice most dedicated to the unitary executive: Justice Scalia. Before taking his seat on the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia emphasized the importance of the doctrine of standing to the separation of powers. 82 On the Court, he authored the majority opinion in Lujan. 83 He is also a firm be liever in the unitary executive -the only Ju stice to conclude the independent counsel statute is unconstitutional because it gives purely executive functions to a person "whose actions are not fully within the supervision and control of the President. "84 Although he has denied that his views on standing are simply a dislocated ver sion of his views on the unitary executive,85 he has explicitly stated it has everything to do with the scope of the legislative power, and nothing to do with the meaning of the terms "case" and "controversy." 
He wrote:
Our opinion is not motivated, as Justice Stevens suggests, by the more specific sepa ration-of-powers concern that this citizen's suit "somehow interferes with the Execu tive's power to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,' Art. II, § 3 .... " The courts must stay within their constitutionally prescribed sphere of action, whether or not exceeding that sphere will harm one of the other two branches. This case calls for noth ing more than a straightforward application of our standing jurisprudence, which, though it may sometimes have an impact on presidential powers, derives from Article III, and not Article II.
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Envt., 523 U. S. 83, 102 n.4 (1998) unitary executive to conclude that "Congress should not be able to confer on private citizens the general power to vindicate rights shared by the public as a whole."). Clanton, supra note 15, at 1040, n.251 (noting that a legislatively-created bounty might be a sufficient personal stake for an informer action, but relying on Article II to conclude that "separation of powers that the reason (in his view) Congress cannot create citizen standing to vindicate the public interest is that such citizen standing would operate to transfer the President's most important duty: to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.s6
There is, of course, a large and ongoing debate about the mean ing of Article II. There are those, such as Justice Scalia, who con tend that Article II creates a unitary executive and that anyone exercising any part of national executive power must be answerable to the President.s7 There are others who contend that Article II is perfectly consistent with creating officers and agencies who admin ister the law with considerable autonomy from presidential con troi.ss In addition, there are those who are willin g to accept, at least for purposes of argument, that the original understanding of Article II was a unitary one, but that modern conditions require the accept ance of greater autonomy of those with executive power.s9 There are even those who argue that the original understanding accepted considerable autonomy, but that modern conditions may call for a unitary executive.9o I do not attempt to resolve that debate, or even to enter into it. Instead, my point is that this is the right set of questions to be askprinciples in the United States limit Congress' ability to give the public at large penalties to prosecute others for breaches of law").
86. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577. In his dissent in Akins, Justice Scalia reiterated the same concern. "A system in which the citizenry at large could sue to compel executive compliance with the law would be a system in which the courts, rather than the President, are given the primary responsibility to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfull y executed.' Art. II, § 3." Fe deral Election Commn. v. Akins, 118 S. Ct. 1777 , 1791 (1992 (Scalia, J., dissenting) . A similar reliance on Article II appears in Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court in Alden v. Maine, 119 S.Ct. 2240 . There the Court held that Congress lacks the Article I power to authorize private litigants to bring suits for money damages against unconsenting states, but distinguished suits brought "in the name of the United States by those who are entrusted with the constitutional duty to 'take care that the laws be faithfull y executed,' U.S. CONST. (1996) (arguing that history does not support a formalist interpretation of the separation of powers and that the "Constitution was a sketch that left the future resolution of separation of powers matters mainly to the processes inked in at the highest levels of the three branches"). REv. 1, 86 (1994) (arguing that the framers distinguished between executive power and administrative power, but suggesting that " [u] nder current circumstances, a strongly unitary executive is the best way of keeping faith with the most fundamental goals of the original scheme"). [Vol. 97:2239 ,, ing -that what is truly at stake in current standing doctrine is not the meaning of Article III, but the meaning of Article II.
Again, criminal cases illustrate the point. If Congress has, within the scope of its enumerated powers under Article I, created a federal crime, there is no constitutional impediment to its pro secution in a federal court. Even if no one has suffered a concrete particularized injury in fact and the only interest being vindicated is the general public interest in law enforcement, and even if the judi ciary would not infer a right of action absent the statute, there is a "case" within the meaning of Article III. The remaining constitu tional question is a question of Article II: Who can prosecute such crimes and thereby vindicate the general public interest? The pos sibilities include fe deral officials, private actors, and even Congress or its members.91
Some might obj ect that, regardless of the degree of indepen dence from the President a criminal prosecutor is permitted by Article II, the named party in the case will be the United States of America, not the particular individual prosecutor. On this view, the question is not who may prosecute crimes and vindicate the general public interest, but rather who is permitted to represent the United States.
Perhaps so, but this rather formal distinction only highlights that the real issue is one under Article II, not Article III. For it would be a simple matter for Congress, any time it wishes to empower someone to vindicate the general public interest, to provide that the person may sue in the name of the United States.92 Indeed, this is precisely how the classic actions brought by private individuals to vindicate the public interest were (and often still are) captioned: mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, quo warranto, qui tam, informer, and relator actions were all brought in the name of the sovereign.93 91. State officials present another possibility, cf Maine v. Ta ylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) (permitting Maine standing to appeal from a federal court of appeals judgment in a federal prosecution), but from the perspective of fe deral separation of powers, they can be assimi Others might object that I am missing a crucial distinction be tween criminal prosecutions and the kinds of cases in which the Court has erected its standing doctrine: unlike criminal prosecu tions, the Court�s standing cases have often involved actions against an official of the fe deral government seeking to control that offi cial's action. I concede, of course, that many (though certainly not all ) of the Court's standing cases have involved federal officials as defendants and that the Court seems particularly concerned about using the judicial power to enforce the public interest against such officials.98 But this distinction turns back on itself. If it is the de fendant's status as a federal official that is driving the decision, it is even clearer that the issue concerns Article II: Who has the power to ensure that the official respects the public interest in compliance with the law?99
Although it may seem odd to even contemplate, another poten tial candidate for representing the public interest in compliance with the law is Congress or its members. Despite its oddity, this approach, unlike the claimed "personal injury" requirement of Article ill , may help illuminate the difficult area of Congressional standing.10° For if Congress has the Article I power to create rights interim appointment of United States Attorney by district court). Ye t again, this highlights that the debate is better focused on Article II than on Article III. of action to vindicate the public interest and Article III permits fed eral courts to hear such actions, it might seem -unless we adopt a unitary view of the executive under Article II -that Congress could give itself (or its members) such rights of action against exec utive officials. But if we stop looking for a "personal injury" that we mistakenly think Article III requires, we might more profitably inform our analysis of congressional standing by asking other ques tions: Has Congress actually provided for such a right of action and, if not, is it appropriate for the judiciary to create one?101 May Congress or its members constitutionally be empowered to bring actions to vindicate the public interest in seeing that the law is obeyed?102 various voters. It decided the case brought by the voters on the merits, and, in light of that disposition, dismissed the case brought by the House for want of a "substantial federal ques tion," without addressing the standing of the House. Dept. of Commerce, 119 S. Ct. at 779.
Only Justices Stevens and Breyer concluded that the House had standing "to challenge the validity of the process that will determine the size of each State's Congressional delegation."
Dept. of Commerce, 119 S. Ct. at 789 (Stevens, J., joined by Breyer, J., dissenting). Although Justices Ginsburg and Souter agreed with Justice Stevens on the merits, they agreed with the majority -but without explanation -that the case filed by the House should be dismissed.
Dept. of Commerce, 119 S. Ct. at 789 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Souter, J, dissenting). It ap pears that, having lost on the merits in the case brought by the various voters, they accepted that decision as precedent in the case brought by the House. For an exploration of when a judge should treat a prior decision in which her position was rejected as a baseline for further decisions, see Suzanna Sherry, Ju stice O'Connor's Dilemma: Th e Baseline Question, 39 WM.
[ Vol. 97:2239 Even if Article II permits individuals with considerable indepen dence from the President to represent the United States and vindi cate the public interest in court, however, members of Congress (and Congress itself) could be precluded from exercising this power themselves. Fi rst, if Article II requires that only officers of the United States represent the United States in vindicating the public interest in court,10 3 then the incompatibility clause104 prevents members of Congress from bringing such actions. But even if such a litigant need not be an officer, it does not follow that such a liti gant can be a member of Congress. The Supreme Court has been far more tolerant when Congress gives law enforcement powers to those with some independence from the president than when it at tempts to give itself or its members a role in the enforcement of the law.105 standing to seek to compel a state official to certify that a federal constitutional amendment had not been ratified where the state senate voted twenty to twenty and the Lieutenant Governor cast a deciding vote in favor of the amendment). In Coleman, which involved state legislators, there was no federal separation of powers issue. Cf. Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2319-20 & n. 8 {distinguishing Co leman on the grounds that the voting block in Coleman was sufficient to control the outcome if they were correct that the Lieutenant Governor was not part of the legislature for purposes of ratifying a federal constitutional amendment, and noting that it "need not decide whether Coleman may also be distinguished" on the ground that it "has no applicability to a similar suit brought by federal legislators, since the separation-of-powers concerns present in such a suit were not present in Coleman").
Of course, there is always the question whether any particular Congressionally-created right of action is best understood as an attempt to empower itself or its members to vindicate the public interest. Cf. Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2323 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating that members of Congress are "not simply claiming harm to their interest in having government abide by the Constitution," and that it is "fairly debatable" whether their injury is "sufficiently personal and concrete to give them standing" and therefore "resolv[ing] the question under more general separation-of-power principles"). Reservists, like other standing decisions, is better understood as a judicial refusal to create a public right of action to enforce the incompatibility clause; it should not bar a defensive challenge to the authority of a member of Congress under that clause. There is a signifi cant difference between creating a right of action and recognizing that a defendant may object to the constitutional authority of the plaintiff to bring the action against him. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 73, at 816 n.3 (suggesting that there is a difference between af· firmative rights of action and defenses); Calabresi & Larsen, supra, at n.12 (stating that if a member of Congress was acting as an officer of the United States and "taking government action that bore down on the life, liberty, or property rights of a private individual .•• we would have no doubt that the private individual so affected would have standing to defend against the government action on the ground that it was unconstitutional because of a viola· tion of the Incompatibility Clause.").
105. See supra note 96.
